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Forty-nine U.S. Anny officers with recent combat experience were surveyed to assess their units' 
sleep patterns and to determine the tactics, techniques, and procedures used to counter the effects 
of sleep deprivation in their units. Despite Army policy requiring units to develop and implement 
sleep management plans, nearly 80% of the participants reported they had not been briefed on 
a sleep management plan during their most recent deployment Over one half of the respondents 
reported that fatigue was a problem in their units. During high operational tempo (OPTEMPO), 
which occupied nearly half of their time in ~ombat, participants report receiving only 4 hr of sleep 
daily. The vast majority of respondents (82.6%) reported feeling sleep-deprived at least occasionally 
white at high OPTEMPO. These findings have important implications for the operational readiness 
of all military units deployed to combat environments. 
The demands of modern-day life contribute to work schedules whereby humans chronically 
fail to get adequate amounts of nightly sleep (Dement & Vaughan, I 999). Over the past 
century, research indicates that Americans get significantly less sleep than did our forebears: 
on average, over 2 hr less sleep per night. This alarming trend is even more prevalent among 
professions requiring around-the-clock operations, such as emergency response teams and 
members of the military forces. Professionals in these fields are faced with both acute and 
chronic. sleep deprivation, resulting in a sleep debt that undoubtedly affects their performance 
and safety. Cutbacks in military spending-and the desire to do more with less--have led 
to increased pressure for military, personnel to work longer hours with less time off, and 
increased operational tempo (OPTEMPO). This term, referring to the pace of military missions 
(Department of the Army, 1996), can be interpreted as the military equivalent of workload, 
and it is known to affect soldier and unit performance (Castro & Adler, 1999; Thomas, Adler, 
& Castro, 2005). Problems from excessive workload are further exacerbated by the dangerous 
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combat environments and poor sleeping conditions faced by members of the U.S. military when 
engaged in combat operations. 
The effects of sleep deprivation on performance are well documented in the scientific 
literature (Belenky et al., 2003; Van Dongen, Maislin, Mullington, & Dinges, 2003). In fact, 
the performance. degradation from sleep deprivation has been likened to that experienced by 
alcohol intoxication (Dawson & Reid, 1997). In particular, psychomotor vigilance is dramat-
ically· altered when sleep is restricted. Vigilance is crucial for many military tasks including 
watch-standing and tactical operations. When vigilance is degraded, important information is 
invariably missed, placing both service members and the mission at greater risk of failure. 
Harrison and Home (2000) reviewed the effects of sleep deprivation on a wide range of 
cognitive activities, including decision making. They pointed out that senior mangement and 
military leaders are often required to work extended hours during times of crisis, making 
high-level decisions in complex, dynamic, and dangerous environments. The sleep deprivation 
experienced by these decision makers may not not affect complex, rule-based, logical task 
• performance-perhaps due to heightened interest and compensatory efforts by participants. 
However, they concluded that sleep deprivation does affect decisions that involve creative 
solutions, dynamic replanning, managing competing demands, and complex communications-
all critical macrocognitive activities inherent in military environments. Harrison and Home 
discussed the critical role of the prefrontal cortex in tasks of this nature, and suggested that 
sleep deprivation "presents particular difficulties for sleep-deprived decision makers who require 
these latter skills during emergency situations" (p. 236). Other recent studies have also linked 
sleep deprivation to altered electrical activity in the prefrontal cortex, adding credence to this 
argument and offering a physiological rationale to explain macrocognitive changes. 
The effects of fatigue are insidious. Humans, especially sleep-deprived ones, are not adept 
at judging when their performance is impaired. There is an attitude among those in the military 
that may actually contribute to sleep deprivation by encouraging stoic denial of the need for 
sleep (Davenport & Lee, 2007; Shay, 1998). A study conducted at the National Training Center 
found that the amount of sleep received was inversely proportional to rank, indicating that senior 
leadership received even less sleep than those junior to them (Belenky, 1997). Sleep-deprived 
leaders appear to have a diminished capacity to recognize their own sleep debt, as well as 
the sleep debt of their subordinates. Instead, these leaders need strategies for effective fatigue 
mitigation and fatigue countermeasure guidance that can be implemented easily. 
Army regulations address sleep-related issues as part of combat and operational stress and 
battle fatigue (a military term for combat stress symptoms and reactions; Department of the 
Army, 2009). Military leaders are required to focus their efforts on their units' operational 
stress management. The following list of suggested fatigue countermeasures is routinely given 
to commanders: encourage napping, provide quiet and dark rest areas, and use of stimulants 
(caffeine). Commanders are advised to be cautious with sleep-inducing agents given the con-
sequent performance impairment that these agents may induce. Appropriate scheduling of shift 
work is another method to maintain unit performance during operations (Department of the 
Army, 2009). Before deployment, sleep and fatigue issues are always a concern for the chain 
of command, and military leaders are advised at staff meetings to enforce sleep management 
plans for their units. 
This article reports the results of a survey of self-reported sleep and napping patterns, 
OPTEMPO, and stress of U.S. Army officers recently returned from deployments to Iraq or 
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Afghanistan. The focus of the study is on two areas: the sleep patterns of individual soldiers and 
military units engaged in continuous operations; and, the tactics, techniques, and procedures 
used by forward-deployed units to counter fatigue. 
METHOD 
Participants and Setting 
This study focuses on sleep issues during military operations. The study respondents were 
recruited after consulting with the senior leadership at the Infantry Officer Advanced Course 
(IOAC) at Fort Benning, Georgia. Study participants were a convenience· sample of 49 male 
returning combat-deployed Army officers enrolled in the IOAC. As reported by the school 
leadership, the distribution of IOAC attendees is representative of the larger deployed force of 
U.S. Army officers in terms of age, rank, and experience. 
Instrument . 
The questionnaire was specifically constructed to evaluate the respondent's most recent combat 
deployment, and was composed of 13 questions. Three questions were open-ended, wherea8 
the other 10 questions included numerical inputs, dichotomized inputs, or ratings on 5-point 
Likert-type scales. The questionnaire included the following sections: 
I. Demographic information: age, rank, gender, Military Occupational Specialty, total years 
of service, commissioned years of service, and number and total length of all combat 
deployments. · 
2. Briefing on sleep management plan (yes or no). 
3. Sleep issues. related to. the participant's unit: "My unit worked in shifts;' "My unit 
encouraged and monitored naps," "My unit designated dark and quite areas for rest," 
and "My unit tried to enforce sleep schedules." 
4. Fatigue and sleep routines management question; "Fatigue was a problem in my unit," 
and "My unit did a good job managing sleep routines!' 
5. OPTEMPO occurrence. The participant estimated the percentage of time spent in 
OPTEMPO level (high, moderate, or low) during last deployment. 
6. Daily sleep question: Participant reported the average amount of daily sleep by OPTEMPO 
level. 
7. Napping question: "In addition to one major sleep period, I took naps to get more 
sleep:' Participants estimated the. occurrence of napping by OPTEMPO level. 
8. Sleep deprivation question: "How often did you experience sleep deprivation symp--
toms?" Input included frequency of occurrence for each OPTEMPO level. 
9. Deployment issues question: Over the course of the deployment, "Sleep deprivation was 
a serious problem in your unit;' "You were exposed to significant sources of stress," 
"You would characterize your stress level as very high;' and "Compared to your normal 
life, you used more caffeinated, drinks (coffee, soft drinks, or tea)." 
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I 0. Sleep evaluation question: "When I reflect on my own sleep patterns and the sleep 
? patterns of the soldiers with whom I served throughout the entire deployment, I would 
characterize that sleep as .... " Participants rated sleep quantity (their own, peers, su-
periors, and subordinates) on a 5-point scale ranging from I (much less than needed'), 
2 (less than needed'), 3 (about right), 4 (more than needed'), to 5 (much more than 
needed'). · 
11. Three open-ended questions: "Indicate other things your unit did to address sleep issues," 
"Indicate positive factors that affected your unit's rest," and "Indicate negative factors 
that affected your unit's rest." 
Questions 3, 4, and 7 to 9 were rated on a 5-point Likert scale ranging from I (never), 2 
(rarely), 3 (occasionally), 4 (sometimes), to 5 (all the time) . 
Statistical Analysis • 
Answers to the survey questions were entered into a Microsoft Excel spreadsheet. Statistical 
analysis was conducted with Excel and JMP Release 7.0. Data normality was assessed with 
the Shapiro-Wilk W test. Initially, the data were analyzed for outliers. Analyses of variance 
(ANOVAs), chi-square analyses, and nonparametric tests were used when appropriate to assess 
the study responses. Statistical significance was indicated for two-tailed p values of <.05. 
The independent variables were OPTEMPO and whether participants had been briefed on a 
sleep management plan. The main dependent variables examined were self-reported sleep and 
napping, sleep deprivation symptoms and stress, and assessment of unit sleep issues. 
Procedures 
Study participants were volunteers who provided their informed consent after being briefed 
about the study. The survey was ~dministered to the entire group of officers after they were 
informed of their right to decline participation. The study instrument and research protocol was 
accepted by the Infantry School leadership, and approved by the Naval Postgraduate School 
institutional review board. All participants were asked to fill out the study questionnaire. 
RESULTS 
Demographic Data 
Two participants reported that they had never deployed to combat, whereas one participant 
reported having deployed· 10 times in just 6 years of service (Mahalanobis outlier distance = 
5.81). These 3 participants were excluded from further analysis. This article focuses on the 
remaining 46 participants. The average age of the study participants was 29.4 years (SD= 4.4, 
Mdn = 28); 6 of the respondents held the rank of first lieutenant, 38 were captains, and 2 were 
majors. The average length of time in military service was 8.1 years (SD = 5.0, Mdn = 6.5). 
The majority of the participants (7 l.I % ) had only one deployment to combat, whereas the 
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remainder had more than one combat deployment (2 deployments: 20%; 3 deployments: 6.7%; 
and 4 deployments: 2.2% ). On average, respondents reporred thllt; the total; time they: had 
deployed to combat was 15.5 months (SD= 11.7, Mdn = 12.0): · ·· 
Sleep Plan 
Approximarely 80% of the participants in the study reported that they w~ notbrie~ed ~n a 
sleep management plan during their most recent deployment (not briefed: n -:d::. 37,' or 80-.4%; 
briefed: n = 9, or 19.6%). Briefing status was independent of age, rank, length of total time 
in service, and length of commissioned· service. 
We also examined the extent to which the participants' units focused on sleep issues 
and on the use of countermeasures that could mitigare the impact of fatigue on individual 
and unit performance. We focused on participants' responses to known interventions used in 
military operations in order to reduce the deleterious effect of sleep deprivation: (a) shift-
working, (b) encouraging and monitoring naps, (c) designating dark and quiet areas for rest, 
and (d) enforcing sleep schedules. The frequency of responses for these four survey items 
is shown in Figure l. The percentage of participants is shown by the number at the top of 
each bar. For example, in Figure l, 25% of the total number of those responding to this item 
answered "never'' to whether their uni.t worked in shifts. 
Of particular interest and concern is the large proportion of "never" or "rarely" answers 
in Figure 1. For example, 73.9% of the respondents reported that their unit never or rarely 
encouraged or monitored naps, whereas 66.7% of respondents reported that their unit never or 
rarely designated dark or quiet areas for rest. One half of the respondents (50%) answered that 
they had never, or rarely, tried to enforce sleep schedules, indicating that most units may not 
have openly addressed sleep issues. 
We attempted to quantify the implementation of fatigue interventions during operations by 
combining the responses to the four questions (shift-working, napping, rest areas designation, 
and sleep schedules enforcement) to arrive at an overall metric, "sleep hygiene rating:' (For 
this study, we use this term to refer only to these 4 sleep-promoting factors that are specifically 
mentioned in the existing Army regulations.) This sleep hygiene rating indicates the overall 
attention or emphasis placed on· sleep issues by any given unit. The point values for each 
participant's response were summed. across the four questions in this group, giving each 
participant an overall score. 'These SCOt'es'ranged from 4 (the minimum value when all answers 
were "never'') to 20 (the maximU1ll value when all answers were "all the time"). For example, 
a respondent answering "rarely" to all four items would have an overall sleep hygiene rating 
of 8, whereas a participant responding "occasionally" to all four items would have a sleep 
hygiene rating of 12. Similarly, a respondent indicating "sometimes" to all four items would 
have a score of 16. Higher sleep, hygiene ratings indicate that the unit was more attentive 
to sleep hygiene, whereas lower scores indicate that less attention was paid to unit sleep 
hygiene. · · . .· .. . , 
The results showed that participalits' sleep hygiene ratings were related to whether or not 
they were briefed on a sleep management plan during their most recent deployment (Van 
der Waerden nonparametric rest, I-way chi-square approximation): x2(1, N = 44) = 2.7936, 
p = .09; briefed: n = 9 (Mn==:.: fl.56, SD = 5.20); not briefed: n = 35 (M = 9.26, 
SD = 3.83). Simply stated, unitS that briefed its members on sleep plans also engaged in 
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25.0 25.0 
Never Rarely Occaslonally All the time 
58.T • 
13.0 8.7 4.3 




Never Rarely Occasionally Sometimes All the time 
! My unit tried to enforce sl•p schedules. (Survey Item 30) 
37.0 
Never Rarely Occasionally Sometimes All the time 
FIGURE 1 Frequency of answers regarding sleep hygiene and the use of fatigue countermeasures. 
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FIGURE 2 Frequency of overall sleep hygiene ratings as a function of sleep plan briefing status. Note. 
Higher ratings indicate better sleep hygiene. 
other fatigue management practices. Figure 2 shows the frequency of the overall sleep hygiene 
rating, depending on whether or not the participants had been briefed on a sleep plan. 
It is interesting to note that, although the participants who reported they had been briefed on 
a sleep plan generally had higher overaJI sleep hygiene ratings, 3 members of that group had 
very low overall sleep hygiene ratings. The specific type of units and the missions to which 
these individuals were assigned is unknown. 
Overall Unit Fatigue and Sleep Management 
The next section of the questionnaire asked respondents to rate their agreement· .with. the 
statements that "fatigue was a problem" in their unit and that their unit "dida good job managing 
sleep routines:' Although we were not able to collect objectively determined measures of sleep 
in these deployed units, these subjective answers represent individual asse5sments of fatigue 
severity and unit effectiveness with respect to sleep management. Figuie 3 shows the respanses 
to "Fatigue was a problem in my unit." A majority of respondents (over 55%) agreed or strongly 
agreed that fatigue was a problem in their unit. · · ' 
Sleep plan briefing status was a significant determinant for participants' evaluation of 
whether their unit managed sleep routines well, F(l, 43) = 9.0378, p = .004 JVan der 
Waerden nonparametric test, 1-way chi-square approximation): x2(1, N = 45) = 7.5404, 
p = .006). Nearly two thirds ofparticipants (66%) who were briefed on a sleep plan agreed 
or strongly agreed that their unit did a good job managing sleep routines. This finding is· in 
stark contrast to the responses of participants who did not receive sleep plan briefings; of those 
not receiving a sleep plan briefing, only 24.3% agreed that their unit did a good job managing 
sleep routines. Those respondents who received a sleep plan briefing were much more likely 
to agree that their unit did a good job managing sleep routines. 
'I 
I' 








Strnngly disagree NoOptlbn 
FatV-» wao • problem In ny uni 
FIGURE 3 Frequency of responses to Survey Item 4A ("Fatigue was a problem in my unit") as a function 
of sleep plan briefing status. 
Finally, participants indicating that their units did a good job at sleep routine management 
were those who placed an emphasis on sleep issues (as shown by increased sleep hygiene 
ratings: correlation, r = .484; n = 43; p < .001). 
OPTEMPO 
Participants were asked to estimate the percentage of time during their last deployment that 
they spent at high, moderate, or low OPfEMPO, based on their subjective assessments of 
OPfEMPO load. Nearly half (46.7%) of the time (SD = 23.0%), participants reported that 
their units were at high OPfEMPO, contrasted with 36.3% of the time (SD = 17.8%) at 
moderate OPfEMPO and 17.5% of the time (SD= 17.2%) at low OPfEMPO. 
For each OPfEMPO level, participants reported the average amount of daily sleep they re-
ceived. Results showed that reported daily sleep varies with OPfEMPO: ANOVA, F(2, 122) = 
69.3067, p < .0001; median test, xi= 70.2601, p < .0001-that is, the higher the OPfEMPO, 
the less sleep participants received (low: M = 7.80 hr, SD = 1.52 hr, Mdn = 8.00 hr; moderate: 
M = 6.00 hr, SD= 1.33 hr, Mdn = 6 hr; and high: M = 3.90 hr, SD= 1.56 hr, Mdn = 4 hr). 
Reported daily sleep was also related to the overall sleep hygiene rating, which may reflect 
the extent to which participants were able to implement sleep hygiene practices while in the 
field. This association was significant only at high and moderate OPfEMPO levels: high, 
F(I, 42) = 6.1292, p = .0174; and moderate, F(l, 41) = 6.5587, p = .0142. 
Frequency of Naps 
Respondents were asked to rate the frequency with which they used naps to augment their 
major sleep period when they were at high, moderate, or low OPfEMPO. Figure 4 shows 
the frequency of these answers. Not surprisingly, increased OPfEMPO is associated with 
less napping (i.e., napping frequency drops off as the time available to do anything, other 
than operations, becomes more limited). This finding could account, in part, for the reduction 
in average daily sleep during high OPfEMPO. If one combines the two napping categories, 
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FIGURE 4 Fm1uency of answers to Survey Item 7 ("In addition to one major sleep period, I took naps to 
get more sleep") versus operational tempo (OPTEMPO). · 
"never" and "rarely," 45% of the participants reported that during low and moderate OPTEMPO; 
they never or rarely napped. During high OPTEMPO, this percentage reached nearly 60%. 
Sleep Deprivation 
Participants were asked to rate the frequency of sleep deprivation symptoms when they were 
at high, moderate, or low OPTEMPO. Results showed that increasing OPTEMPO levels lead 
to greater severity of sleep deprivation symptoms: likelihood ratio test, x2(1, N = 46) = 
44.502, p = .0001. Consequently, 53.5% of the participants reportCd that they rarely or never 
felt sleep deprivation symptoms during low OPTEMPO, whereas this percentage decreased to 
37.8% during moderate OPTEMPO, and it was only 17.4% during high OPTEMPO. Clearly, an 
overwhelming number of respondents (82.6%) reported they felt sleep-deprived occasionally, 
sometimes, or all the time while at high OPTEMPO. 
Sleep Deprivation and Stress Levels 
Given that the questions so far captured a subjective evaluation of daily sleep, napping, and 
sleep deprivation, the next group of questions assessed the severity of sleep deprivation, the 
level of stress experienced during the deployment, and the use of caffeinated drinks. 
Participants indicated that sleep deprivation was occasionally regarded as a serious problem 
in their unit (M = 2.67, SD = 0.96, Mdn = 3.00). During deployments, they were "some-
times" exposed to significant sources of stress (M = 3.91, SD= l.05, Mdn = 4.00). The more 
strenuous the deployment (higher OPTEMPO), the more they experienced significant stress 
(Spearman's p = 0.42, p = .003). Participants who indicated more exposure to stress also 
indicated that they got more naps during high OPTEMPO (Spearman's p = 0.31, p = .038), 
possibly because the efficacy of napping becomes more evident during such missions. 
Stress level on the most recent deployment was reported as occasionally very high (M = 
3.37, SD= l.06, Mdn = 3.00). In general~ the frequency of very high stress levels was related 
to the frequency of sleep deprivation symptoms during high OPTEMPO missions (Spearman's 
p = 0.32, p = .033), whereas there is negative relationship between reported daily sleep 
during such operations (Speannan's p = 0.37, p = .014; i.e., personnel sleeping more felt 
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less extreme stress). It was not all that surprising that the deployed personnel reported that 
they "sometimes" consume more caffeinated drinks (coffee, soft drinks, or tea) compared to 
their normal life (M = 3.44, SD = 1.55, Mdn = 4.00), with the percentage of participants 
reporting increased consumption "all the time" reaching 40% (n = 18). The frequency of 
caffeine consumption increase was related to the frequency of sleep deprivation symptoms 
during moderate (Spearman's p = 0.46, p = .001) and high OP'IEMPO (Spearman's p = 0.39, 
p = .008). 
Unit Sleep Patterns 
To address unit sleep patterns, respondents were asked to report on their own sleep patterns and 
those of subordinates, peers, and superiors. Overall, participants reported that the sleep they 
received during deployment was not enough (Mdn = 2: "less than needed"). They reported that 
subordinates' and peers' sleep was "about right" (median response), whereas they reported that 
sleep for "self' and "superiors" was "~ss than needed" (median response). Of the four sleep 
categories (self, subordinates, peers, and superiors), an overwhelming majority of respondents 
reported that their superiors slept significantly less than needed (Kruskal-Wallis rank sum 
test), x2(l,. N = ) = 6.1655, p = .013). Nearly 70% of respondents reported that their 
superiors receive less or much less than the amount of sleep they needed. Nearly one half of 
the resj>otidents (47.0%) reported that subordinates receive less or much less sleep than needed. 
When looking at their own sleep patterns, over one half (55.1%) of respondents reported 
receiving less or much less sleep than they need. 
Interventions to Address Sleep Issues 
An open-ended question asked respondents to report things that positively affected the sleep 
of their unit. Twelve participants noted the following factors: (a) shift work and rotation of 
individuals or squads; (b) monitoring personnel performance and motivation by. unit leaders; 
(c) enforcing a work schedule, mandatory sleep periods, or days off; and (d) employing 
operational risk-management policies when conducting operations. 
Negative Factors Affecting Unit Rest 
Participants were also asked to report any factors that adversely affected their unit. These 
comments from 16 respondents are summarized in the following categories: (a) heat stress, 
(b) working long duty hours or non-optimized rotations, (c) lack of soldiers' refit opportunities, 
(d) increased workload due to reduced manning, (e) commitments other than conducting 
operations, (t) high OPTEMPO, (g) difficulty in scheduling activities, and (h) poor management 
of personnel. 
DISCUSSION 
This study afforded an opportunity to address sleep deprivation issues during military operations 
from the viewpoint of Army officers newly returned from combat. The way respondents were 
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detennined poses both a strength and a threat to the validity of our findings. The survey 
respondents are not a random sample of all Anny officers, but represent a "convenience" 
sample of deployed Anny officers taking part in the operations currently conducted in Iraq 
and Afghanistan. These officers were drawn from the larger population of Army officers who 
conduct their duties as junior leaders for the deployment period. We attempted to minimire 
possible bias of the sample by coordinating with the school's leadership to recruit respondents, 
since course attendants represent a typical group of returning Anny officers. One strength of 
this study is the use of these "real-world" respondents, since they lend external validity to the 
results. 
This study identifies several disturbing findings. The results indicate that a very · high 
percentage (80%) of participants did not receive a briefing on sleep management planning, 
although such briefings are mandatory under U.S. Anny policy. The majority of participants in 
this survey were junior leaders (i.e., platoon leaders, company commanders, or staff officers at 
the company or battalion level): If they did not receive briefings on sleep management planning, 
it is likely they did not give such briefings to the soldiers for whom they were responsible. The 
findings from this survey indicate that this figure has dropped even lower than that reported by 
Doheney (2004), pointing to the possibility that commanders address sleep management issues 
even less now than at the beginning of the Global War on Terror. In many units, even the 
most basic sleep and fatigue management practices (e.g., encouraging napping or designating 
dark and quiet places to sleep) were not implemented. Fortunately, the study also revealed that 
briefing soldiers on (and implementing) sleep plan management had a positive effect on the 
sleep hygiene of a unit. 
Another notable finding in the study relates to the sleep reported for each level of OPTEMPO. 
Respondents reported spending nearly half their time at high OPTEMPO-as much as 7 months 
of a 15-month deployment-during which time they averaged approximately 4 hr of sleep per 
night. Unquestionably, 4 hr of sleep is insufficient for young men and women whose survival 
is dependent upon their ability to remain vigilant. 
The amount of daily sleep reported by respondents to our survey is significantly lower than 
the recommended requirement of 8 hr of sleep per day. Yet, this result is in keeping with results 
from other studies conducted in Southwest Asia, which reported sleep issues in U.S. Anny and 
Marine Aviation units (Doheney, 2004; Miller, Shattuck, & Matsangas, 2006). (For a review 
of fatigue in military operational environments, refer to Miller, Matsangas, & Shattuck, 2008.) 
OPTEMPO also appeared to be related to napping behavior: When soldiers were getting the 
least amount of sleep (i.e., during high OPTEMPO), they were also least likely to take naps. 
Soldiers who deploy to a Combat Training Center and are at high OPTEMPO for a few 
weeks may be able to sustain an acceptable level of perfonnance. However, placing soldiers in 
dangerous environments for up to 15 months and restricting their sleep will inevitably take its 
toll. The effects of acute and chronic sleep deprivation, coupled with other stressors of combat, 
could quite possibly impact soldiers long after they have returned home. Recovery from trauma 
and stress, whether physical or psychological, requires a sufficient amount of quality sleep 
(Dolan, Adler, Thomas; &: Castro, 2005). Chronic sleep restriction may exacerbate underlying 
health issues and prevent the. body from healing and fending off stress-related illnesses (Naitoh, 
Kelly, & Englund, 1990).~ ·· · 
Responses evaluating self, ~·, subordinates', and superiors' sleep suggest worrisome 
trends as well. Respondents acknowledged that the amount of sleep received by the participants 
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and others with whom they served was inadequate. In fact, they reported that those in more 
senior leadership positions (and, therefore, those who had more responsibility) were 20% more 
likely to get inadequate sleep. This finding is consistent with earlier studies (Belenky, 1997). 
The very people who are making decisions that will affect the greatest number of soldiers are 
getting the least amount of sleep, and are likely to be the most impaired as a result of their 
sleep deprivation. 
There are two final concerns raised by the survey results. First is the continuous push "to 
do more with less." Survey responses regarding management of work and rest schedules while 
deployed suggest that units are undermanned with respect to the missions they are given. Units 
compensate for lack of personnel in various ways. For example, the number of patrols a soldier 
must perform may increase, the number of soldiers sent out on a patrol may be decreased, or 
the length of a soldier's shift may increase. Any of these compensatory strategies could have 
negative consequences. Second is the inference that soldiers are not being managed properly. 
This may suggest a lack of good leatJership or, perhaps, an inadequate understanding of Army 
doctrine with respect to sustained operations. Although there is Army doctrine that addresses 
issues such as sleep hygiene, it is either not adequate or not widely known. 
We conclude this article with an excerpt from Shay (1998): 
Pretending to be superhuman is very dangerous. In a well-led military, the self-maintenance of the 
commander, the interests of his or her country, and the good of the troops are incommensurable only 
when the enemy succeeds in making them so. It is time to critically reexamine our love affair with 
stoic self-denial, starting with the service academies. If an adversary can tum our commanders into 
sleepwalking zombies, from a moral point of view the adversary has done nothing fundamentally 
different than destroying supplies of food, water, or ammunition. Such could be the outcome, 
despite our best efforts to counter it. But we must stop doing it to ourselves and handing the 
enemy a dangerous and unearned advantage. (p. 104) 
To Shay (1998), we add this: Although military leaders often must rely on other units to re-
supply them with food, water, or ammunition, well-rested soldiers are a resource almost entirely 
under the leaders' control. As leaders put a great deal of effort into managing the logistical 
resources of combat, they must also expend time and effort into managing the alertness of 
their soldiers. Failure to attend to either logistical or human resources can lead to the same 
dire consequences. 
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